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Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism”. By
Lisa Stampnitzky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2014. ISBN 978-1-10769734-8. Tables. Index, Sources cited. Pp.
xii, 232. $44.99.
Lisa Stampnitzky’s book Disciplining Terror won the 2012 Social Science
History Association President’s Book Award. It is both challenging and
rewarding, but recommended primarily for the student interested in how
terrorism came to be a topic of study used for political ends. The book does
not study terrorism per se, but rather examines how “experts” (real and selfproclaimed) have viewed terrorism over the last fifty years and the various
prisms through which terrorism has been viewed in the last fifty years. For
one seeking to learn about terrorism, its history, its ideologies, and
personalities, this is not the book they seek.
The author discusses the hijackings in the early 1960s that led to changes in
aviation security. That activity was from guerrillas, revolutionaries, and
insurgents, but not terrorists according to the definitions of the day. The U.S.
viewed air piracy as a criminal act falling under the jurisdiction of law
enforcement. By the mid-1970s, hijacking came to include hostage taking and
was viewed as terrorism. Stampnitzky outlines how political violence became
“terrorism” and how this process drove U.S. policy as defined by an everevolving cadre of “experts.”
The author posits many who analyze terrorism refuse to consider that
terrorists are rational actors with reasons for carrying out their activities. In
doing so, they miss an opportunity to examine terrorism to better understand
the motivations behind their actions. She also indicates that terrorism is
difficult to define as there are myriad definitions and points of view (e.g. one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter). In such a quagmire of
competing definitions, self-proclaimed “experts” can step in to define the
issue in terms of rationality, morality, and politicization. “Terrorism”
emerged . . . as an inherently problematic concept – undefinable, infused with
moral absolutism, and deeply politicized – leading to persistent difficulties for
those who would create national knowledge about it. (9)
The author states terrorism covers several disciplines, and rhetorically
ponders if unbiased knowledge of the topic is possible as anyone can selfproclaim as an “expert” with no objective standard against which to be
judged.
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“Yet terrorism experts have never consolidated control over the
production of either experts or knowledge. New “selfproclaimed” experts constantly emerge, no licensing body exists
to certify “proper” expertise, and there is no agreement among
terrorism experts about what constitutes useful knowledge. In
sociological terms, the boundaries of the field are weak and
permeable. There is little regulation of who may become an
expert, and the key audience for terrorism expertise is not an
ideal-typical scientific community of other terrorism experts
but, rather, the public and the state.
Rather than a purely political or analytical concept, expert
discourse on “terrorism” must be understood as operating at
the contested boundary between politics and science, between
academic expertise and the state.” (12-13)
In the 1960s and 1970s, terrorism was viewed as a tactic and
counterinsurgency (COIN) literature sought to examine motivations and
grievances driving the actors. Many who studied the terrorism mindset,
mentality, and motives were maligned and “sympathetic” to the terrorists.
With over 250 definitions, defining how to examine terrorism was
problematic at best. European COIN was a military discipline, whereas the
U.S. had a more academic approach. The 1972 Munich attacks, broadcast
live, brought terrorism to the fore as a political weapon. A mindset that
terrorist acted irrationally and pathologically emerged, ignoring underlying
reasons for their actions. Brian Jenkins of RAND (a true expert) advocated
that terrorism is a means to an end and its objectives must be understood in a
larger political and social context.
The Department of State looked at terrorism as a topic to be handled through
diplomatic channels, replete with contingency plans, and qualitative analysis
to place it within existing governmental frameworks. RAND built databases
of chronological events with specific criteria of what types of incidents to
include or exclude (e.g. – an Irish Republican Army {IRA} attack against
British forces in Northern Ireland was not terrorism, but an IRA attack in
London was).
A new chapter unfolded in the 1980s with the advent of Iranian-sponsored
terror and the Reagan Administration. President Reagan favored military
retaliation (Libya, April 1986) vice diplomacy and framed anti-terror efforts
as a civilizational struggle. The 1979 Jerusalem Conference, Claire Sterling’s
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book, The Terror Network, and a series of U.S. Senate hearings all pointed to
the Soviet Union as a behind the scenes terror sponsor, thus transforming
terrorism into an ideologically-driven political issue in the United States.
The end of the Cold War transitioned to a focus on Islamic terror. The
publications of Bernard Lewis’ article The Roots of Muslim Rage and Samuel
Huntingdon’s Clash of Civilizations gave grist to a whole new cadre of selfproclaimed “experts” who endlessly discussed and analyzed the ramifications
of Lewis’ and Huntingdon’s ideas without having to defend or account for
their hypotheses in an objective forum.
A spate of attacks in the mid-1990s (World Trade Center in 1993, Tokyo
subway and Oklahoma City in 1995, and Hamas against Israel throughout the
decade) highlighted ideology and religion as motivations (described as both
rational and irrational). The Tokyo attack was carried out by a cult with a
fanatical bent towards suicide, while the Oklahoma City attack was carried
out by extreme right-wing lone wolves. John Esposito’s book The Islamic
Threat: Myth or Reality posited that Islam had replaced Communism as the
new “threat” to keep the populace fixated on an exaggerated threat. During
this time, academics and pundits raged on all sides of the issue, while the true
experts tried to keep pace with events as they occurred. Terrorism was
viewed in some academic circle as a subset of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC),
which hearkened back to COIN studies with its emphasis on small wars. The
advent of Usama bin Ladin (UBL) and the East Africa embassy bombings then
placed focus on terrorism and its analysis as the act of non-rational actors
driven by religion, fears of the new millennium, or nihilism. In fact, we now
know that UBL and his organization were rational actors with a means to an
end action plan.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attack, President Bush described
terrorism in terms of an “evil” force to be fought in a struggle for civilization.
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and pre-emptive invasion of Iraq due to
fears of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were part of the Bush
Administration’s so-called “One Percent Doctrine” (if there is even a one
percent chance of a terror attack, that is too high a risk). The Bush
Administration had staff conduct analysis that did not agree with the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or other governmental
entities. To this day, the discrepancies have not been objectively resolved.
“…first, the conceptualization of the terrorist as evil, irrational, and
immune to both rational explanation, and second, the emergence of
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terrorism as a problem that resists rational techniques of management
and governance [have] led to the proposition that terrorists commit
terrorism because they are terrorists. The identity contains its own
explanation: “terrorists” are evil, irrational actors whose action is driven
not by normal interests or political motives but, instead, by their very
nature as terrorists. According to this framework, terrorists did not
necessarily commit acts of violence for any rational political purpose (as
they claimed) but, rather, because of their inherently evil nature” (179180).
The current age has suffered from an “institutionalization” of terrorism
expertise, which has led to what the author describes as “anti-knowledge,”
which is opinionated screed, difficult to objectively analyze.
“Part of the reason why the politics of anti-knowledge holds
such power is the “undisciplined” nature of not just terrorism
studies as a field but “terrorism” as an object of knowledge . . .
terrorism studies did not take shape as an ideal-typical
discipline or intellectual field, the terrorism field remains a
relatively weak, “undisciplined” one, and “terrorism” itself
remains an unstable, “undisciplined” object of knowledge…
Terrorism experts have failed to gain control over either the
boundaries of the field or the production and certification of
experts. There is little regulation of who may become an
expert.” (194-195)
The book outlines the intrinsic difficulties faced by the legitimate terrorism
experts faced with self-proclaimed savants. As terrorism will be an existential
concern for many years, how it is examined and analyzed will be at the fore of
national security topics with no end in sight.
Mark Roberts
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